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Abstract 
In December 1994, Mexico entered a financial crisis. The government abandoned its 
crawling peg exchange rate policy, letting the peso float and devalue substantially. The 
recently privatized banking sector found difficulties in meeting regulatory minimum 
capital. The Mexican government assisted with a $52 billion international financial 
package, enacted multiple programs to contain the crisis. The first program introduced to 
recapitalize the banks was the Temporary Capitalization Program (PROCAPTE) in February 
1995. Banks could issue subordinated debentures to the Bank Fund for Savings Protection 
(FOBAPROA). These debentures were convertible into equity shares (common stock) with 
voting rights after five years. Banks would receive cash for the debentures, however, they 
had to maintain these cash proceeds at the Bank of Mexico. On March 31, 1995, six banks 
were recapitalized, including Serfin, Inverlat, and Bital—the third-, fourth-, and fifth-largest 
banks in Mexico. The overall amount of recapitalization was $950 million, increasing banks’ 
average capitalization ratio from 5.8% to 9.6%. 
Keywords: capital injections, crisis, FOBAPROA, Mexico, peso crisis, PROCAPTE, 
recapitalizations
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering responses to financial crises that pertain to broad-based capital injections programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of- 
financial-crises. 






At a Glance  
Mexico completed the privatization of its 
banking sector in 1992. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), binding Mexico to the US and 
Canada, went into force in 1994. Foreign 
inflows increased substantially and the 
debt of Mexican banks to foreign banks 
increased from $8 billion in 1991 to 
$16.5 billion in 1994. 
After a year of political turmoil, Mexico 
entered a financial crisis in December of 
1994. The country’s international 
reserves had fallen from $29 billion in 
February 1994 to $6 billion in December 
1994. The Mexican government had kept 
a crawling peg exchange rate policy that 
allowed the peso to depreciate gradually. 
However, on December 20, 1994, the 
newly elected government widened the 
band and the peso devalued by 15% 
against the US dollar. Two days later, 
Mexico let the peso float freely, resulting 
in a major depreciation and escalating 
difficulties. 
Multiple banks had trouble meeting 
regulatory minimum capital 
requirements of 8% of risk-weighted 
assets and increased provisions on 
nonperforming loans. The first of 
multiple measures the government 
introduced to support capitalization was 
the Temporary Capitalization Program 
(PROCAPTE) in February 1995. Banks 
could issue subordinated debentures to 
the Bank Fund for Savings Protection 
(FOBAPROA). These were convertible into equity shares (common stock) with voting rights 
after five years. Banks would receive cash for the debentures, provided that they 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To temporarily capitalize the commercial 
banking system, while each bank was seeking additional 
capital, without incurring any fiscal cost 
Announcement date February 24, 1995 
Operational date March 31, 1995 
End of issuance window  N/A 
Legal authority Law of Credit Institutions 
Program size Sufficient to raise the 
capital level of participating 
banks above 9% 
Total utilization  Recapitalizations totaled 
$950 million 
Participants Six banks 
Outcomes Average capitalization ratio 
of the six banks increased 
from 5.8% to 9.6% 
Ownership  
Notable feat1 break 
bread slow cooker 8 
hours and workout 
following up Mars team 4 
get done three pound 
brisket transit posted 
attack on top then 
sprinkled over powder 
radiant ures 
Bank of Mexico provided 
funding, sterilizing the 
monetary impact; 
FOBAPROA bought the 
subordinated debentures 
with cash. Banks had to 
maintain the cash at the 
Bank of Mexico for the 
duration of the 
recapitalization; and the 
Bank of Mexico paid 
interest at the same rate as 
the rate on the debentures. 
The debt was essentially 
costless to participating 
banks   
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maintained these cash proceeds at the Bank of Mexico. On March 31, 1995, six banks were 
recapitalized, including Serfin, Inverlat, and Bital—the third-, fourth-, and fifth-largest 
banks in Mexico. The overall amount of recapitalization was $950 million, increasing banks’ 
average capitalization ratio from 5.8% to 9.6%. 
Summary Evaluation 
Some have commented that while PROCAPTE sent a clear message that the government 
was prepared to support the banking system, the market did not appear to view the 
participation of individual banks as a positive measure. Instead, the market considered 
participation as a sign of weakness or as a prelude to intervention. Mackey (1999) wrote 
that “this perception caused some banks to avoid participation in the program entirely and 
other banks to end their participation in the program in a shorter period than expected.” 
476
Mexico Peso Crisis (1994–1995): PROCAPTE León Hoyos
 
 
Mexico Context 1995-1996 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU  
converted to USD) 
$529.4 billion in 1994 
$357.8 billion in 1995 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU  
converted to USD) 
$5,854 in 1994 
$3,928 in 1995 
Sovereign credit rating  
(five-year senior debt) 









Size of banking system 
172.2 billion in total assets in 
1994 
$119.5 billion in total assets in 
1995 
Size of banking system  
as a percentage of GDP 
32.5% in 1994 
33.4% in 1995 
Size of banking system  
as a percentage of financial system 
Data not available for 1994 
Data not available for 1995 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 61% of total banking assets 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
4% of total banking assets in 
1994 
5% of total banking assets in 
1995 
Government ownership of banking system 53% in 1995 
Existence of deposit insurance 
1994: 100% of deposits and all 
bank liabilities (excepting 
subordinated debt) 
1995: 100% of deposits and all 
bank liabilities (excepting 
subordinated debt) 










In 1982, Mexico experienced a crisis and nationalized its banking sector in response. The 
sector was reprivatized a decade later (World Bank 1995). That same year, the country 
signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) together with the US and 
Canada, which entered into force in the beginning of 1994. In this period, foreign capital 
inflows increased substantially, primarily driven by demand for Mexican government 
bonds, both peso-denominated Cetes and dollar-denominated Tesobonos. The debt of 
Mexican banks to foreign banks increased from $8 billion in 1991 to $16.5 billion in 1994 
(Graf 1999). 
The year 1994 was full of political turmoil. The uprising of the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation (EZLN) in the southern state of Chiapas dragged on for months. Four months 
prior to Mexico’s presidential election, Luis Donaldo Colosio, candidate of the long-ruling 
PRI, was assassinated. Assassinations of other high-level politicians and the kidnapping of 
renowned businessmen brought a lot of uncertainty about the stability of the country. 
Fears of a government default siphoned capital from the country. International reserves fell 
from approximately $29 billion in February 1994 to $6 billion in December 1994 (Whitt 
1996).  
On December 1, 1994, the PRI replacement candidate Ernesto Zedillo took office. The 
Mexican peso had kept a crawling peg exchange rate policy to the US dollar that allowed 
the peso to fluctuate at most $0.004 per day. However, on December 20, 1994, the 
government widened the band of acceptable price change and the peso depreciated by 
15%. Two days later, Mexico let the peso float freely, resulting in a major depreciation (see 
Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Mexican peso depreciation 
 
Source: FRED 2020. 
Initially, financial markets were rattled, as the Mexican government seemed slow to 
respond, waiting until January 3, 1995, to announce a limited economic program known as 
the Agreement of Unity to Overcome the Economic Emergency (Acuerdo de Unidad para 
Superar la Emergencia Económica). The program committed the government to austerity, 
in hopes that the exercise would allow Mexico to access an International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Stand-By Arrangement and reassure foreign investors (GAO 1996). Two months 
later, on March 3, 1995, the government announced a revised and much broader financial 
package that contained specific measures to strengthen the financial system. This included 
fiscal and monetary adjustments, programs to deal with troubled banks, and an increase in 
the social safety net. Mexico received financial support through a $52 billion loan package 
from the international financial community, of which the US Treasury Department 
contributed $20 billion, the International Monetary Fund $17.8 billion, and the Bank for 
International Settlements $10 billion, with the rest coming from other bilateral and 
multilateral sources (World Bank 1995). 
The Mexican authorities in charge of overseeing the banking sector were the Bank of 
Mexico, the Ministry of Finance (SHCP), the National Banking and Securities Commission 
(CNBV)3 and the Bank Fund for Savings Protection (FOBAPROA). FOBAPROA served as a 
mechanism for “preventive support” to commercial banks and to protect savings. It was the 
government agency responsible for dealing with bank insolvencies (Graf 1999). It played 
the roles of bank restructuring, deposit insurance, and in some cases, lender of last resort 
 
3 In May 1995, the National Banking Commission (CNB) and the National Securities Commission (CNV) were 
merged to become the CNBV. The CNBV is a dependency of the Ministry of Finance. Its President was 








Nov-94 Jan-95 Mar-95 May-95 Jul-95 Sep-95 Nov-95
Mexican peso/US dollar exchange rate
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(World Bank 1995). FOBAPROA went beyond simple deposit insurance. It provided a 
blanket guarantee of all unsubordinated liabilities of the commercial banks. FOBAPROA 
had broad powers to extend credit to banks to permit them to meet their obligations to 
depositors and other liability holders (World Bank 1995; 1998). 
FOBAPROA was financed by monthly contributions from banks based on their liabilities. 
The Bank of Mexico was authorized to extend loans to FOBAPROA. FOBAPROA could also 
borrow from the Ministry of Finance (World Bank 1995). 
The Bank of Mexico administered the daily operations of FOBAPROA. Meanwhile, 
FOBAPROA’s policy decisions were made by its nine-member Technical Committee. Four 
were from the Ministry of Finance, one being the Minister. Three were from the Bank of 
Mexico, one being the Governor. And two were from the CNBV, one being the President. 
The chairman of the Technical Committee was from the Ministry of Finance and had the 
deciding vote (Mackey 1999, 20; World Bank 1995). The CNBV had been the only agency 
with complete access to bank information. It was mainly the CNBV, with assistance from 
FOBAPROA’s staff, that prepared the technical documents that set the foundation for many 
of the Technical Committee’s decisions. The Bank of Mexico acted as the trustee of 
FOBAPROA, responsible for carrying out the Technical Committee’s resolutions, and signed 
all agreements involving FOBAPROA’s financial assistance (Mackey 1999).  
Some of FOBAPROA’s objectives, as outlined by the Ministry of Finance included: limiting 
the risk of bank runs and preserving financial stability; protecting depositors and bank 
creditors; supporting the liquidity and solvency of institutions; minimizing fiscal costs by 
allocating them over time; and attracting foreign banks (Mackey 1999; Graf 1999). 
During the first months of 1995, Mexican banking authorities, to mitigate the negative 
impacts of the peso crisis, put forward a number of measures that included provisions of 
liquidity, exhaustive inspections of banks that resulted in increased provisions, and a 
Temporary Recapitalization Program (PROCAPTE) for banks (World Bank 1995). The 
depreciation of the peso increased the peso value of loans denominated in foreign 
currency. The capital-asset ratio of the banking system fell from 9.3% by year-end 1994 to 
less than 8% two months later, and the ratio for half of the commercial banks dropped 
below the 8% minimum (Graf 1999). Banks with US dollar liabilities had to set aside an 
increasing amount of capital to cover potential losses from the currency devaluation. 
Meanwhile, higher interest rates increased the number of loan defaults by businesses and 
consumers across Mexico (Bloomberg 1995a). Eduardo Fernandez, President of the CNBV 
at the time, said that as a consequence of the devaluation and the abrupt increase in 
interest rates, the whole Mexican banking system was bankrupt and their equity was 
negative, including Banamex and Bancomer, two of the largest banks with approximately 
50% of the whole market, and 35% of their assets in mortgages. 
Program Description 
On February 22, 1995, the CNBV required all banks to increase provisions to the higher of: 
(a) 4% of the loan portfolio; or (b) 60% of nonperforming loans (NPLs); or (c) provisions 
required from quarterly loan classifications under previous rules (World Bank 1998). This 
arose from a concern that loan classification and provisioning had become difficult for 
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banks to handle in the face of a widespread economic downturn. Under the new formula, all 
banks were required to increase provisions, and several fell short of meeting the required 
8% capitalization (Karaoglan and Lubrano 1995; Mackey 1999). In early March 1995, the 
average reserves for NPLs were about 47.5% (WSJ 1995). 
Bank stocks collapsed after the December 20 devaluation. The market capitalization of the 
whole financial system fell from $26.8 billion to $7.24 billion by early March 1995. Banks 
found it unfeasible to issue new equity, and the prospects of finding foreign equity partners 
for the more distressed banks seemed even more unlikely (FT 1995). 
The Bank of Mexico was essential to the design and implementation of the Temporary 
Capitalization Program (PROCAPTE), introduced on February 24, 1995, in a circular the 
Bank of Mexico sent to all Mexican commercial banks (Mackey 1999). PROCAPTE was 
designed to temporarily recapitalize banks that, due to the economic situation, were unable 
to recapitalize themselves. Additionally, it aimed to signal to the financial markets that the 
government was prepared to support the banking system. PROCAPTE was not intended to 
provide new, permanent capital, as was the case with other government programs later 
introduced (Mackey 1999; see YPFS case by Leon Hoyos and Nye 2021 on FOBAPROA’s 
broad-based asset purchases). FOBAPROA acted as the administrator of PROCAPTE (World 
Bank 1995; Mackey 1999). 
Earlier in February 1995, the Mexican government had amended the Law of Credit 
Institutions to allow for recapitalizations of commercial banks. All commercial banks were 
eligible to apply for PROCAPTE, and participation was voluntary (Mackey 1999). However, 
if a bank whose capital was below the regulatory minimum of 8% of risk-weighted assets 
chose not to participate, it risked losing its banking charter (World Bank 1995). 
Funding for PROCAPTE came from the Bank of Mexico. In March 1995, the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank provided a $3.25 billion loan to the Mexican 
government, $2.25 billion of which was earmarked for support to the banking system, 
particularly to avoid bank insolvencies and help with accounting, public reporting 
standards, and regular inspections (DJ 1995). 
Through PROCAPTE, banks issued subordinated debentures to FOBAPROA in accordance 
with Article 4 of the Law of Credit Institutions. These were convertible into equity shares 
(common stock) with voting rights after five years. FOBAPROA could convert the 
debentures earlier if the bank fell below 2% of risk-weighted assets or if its capitalization 
ratio deteriorated at a rate exceeding 25% of the rate of deterioration of the rest of the 
PROCAPTE banks. After five years, any unpaid amounts would be converted to ordinary 
capital and sold by the government. PROCAPTE aimed to support banks rather than 
shareholders and did not intend to handle insolvencies (OECD 1995). 
FOBAPROA bought the subordinated debentures with cash. However, banks had to deposit 
and maintain the cash proceeds at an account at the Bank of Mexico for the duration of the 
recapitalization (see Figure 2). The Bank of Mexico paid the same rate of interest as the rate 
on the debentures. The size of the issue was sufficient to raise the capital level above 9% 
for the six banks that participated (Karaoglan and Lubrano 1995; World Bank 1995). 
481








Participating banks were not allowed issue dividends, additional capital debt, or additional 
mandatorily convertible subordinated debentures until they repaid FOBAPROA or unless 
these were issued aligned with PROCAPTE (Mackey 1999). If a bank remained in trouble, 
the government could take over the bank (WSJ 1995). If the bank’s capital ratio fell below 
8.5%, FOBAPROA would acquire more subordinated debentures to reach the 9%. If a 
bank's capitalization ratio increased to more than 9%, the bank could redeem, partially or 
fully, the subordinated debentures held by FOBAPROA before their conversion (Karaoglan 
and Lubrano 1995). 
Figure 2: PROCAPTE recapitalization mechanism 







Source: (Mackey 1999) 
At the request of Mexican authorities, the Mexican Congress modified bank ownership laws 
to allow foreign financial institutions to control domestic banks that were in trouble. This 
accelerated the opening of Mexico's banking system to foreign participation (World Bank 
1998). 
Outcomes 
On March 31, 1995, six banks participated in PROCAPTE, including Serfin, Inverlat, and 
Bital—the third-, fourth-, and fifth-largest banks in Mexico. All six banks failed to meet the 
government’s 8% capital requirement and risked losing their banking charters if they did 
not participate (Bloomberg 1995a; see Figure 3).  
  
Bank 
FOBAPROA Bank of Mexico 
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Figure 3:  PROCAPTE recapitalizations on March 31, 1995 






















Serfin 12.1% 3.2 billion $469 
million 
June 1995 None HSBC: 20% 
Inverlat 5.6% 1.4 billion $205 
million 
 Dec. 1995 Scotiabank: 55% 




Sep. 1995 Central Hispano: 
20% 
Confia 2.1% 425 million $62 
million 





2.0% 452 million $66 
million 




Oriente 0.5% 311 million $46 
million 






Total:  6.49 billion $950 
million 
   
a By the end of February 1995, nine banks were below the 8% capitalization ratio 
requirement. The three banks that did not participate in the government’s recapitalization 
program were Banpais, Mexicano, and Probursa (World Bank 1995). 
Banpais had been part of an intervention in February 1995 when the Bank of Mexico placed 
four banks—Obrero, Union, Cremi, and Banpais—under management without recapitalizing 
them (Gutscher 1995). 
Mexicano raised enough capital through a share capital increase and issuance of 
subordinated debt to increase its capitalization ratio above 8% (World Bank 1995). 
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Probursa requested assistance from PROCAPTE. However, the CNBV deferred because the 
Spanish bank Bilbao-Vizcaya (BBV) had placed a bid to acquire a majority interest in 
Probursa. At the time, CNBV anticipated that the investment would increase the bank’s 
capital above the required level, making PROCAPTE assistance unnecessary (LAD 1995b). 
This transaction was ultimately facilitated by a separate FOBAPROA capitalization program 
that included the purchase of troubled loans (World Bank 1998). 
In April, 1995, the CNBV stated that all other Mexican banks met the government's minimum 
capitalization requirements and would not need PROCAPTE assistance in the near term 
(LAD 1995b). 
b Exchange rate on March 31, 1995, was MXN 6.82 = $1 (FRED 2020). 
Sources: Author’s compilation, based on: LAD 1995b; Bloomberg 1995b; Bloomberg 1995c; Graf 1999, table 4; 
Cypher 1996; Reuters 1996; World Bank 1995. 
The combined equity of the six banks totaled MXN 10.2 billion at the end of 1994 (22.8% of 
the system’s total equity) and decreased by about MXN 3 billion by the end of February 
1995.4 The banks’ average capitalization ratio fell from 8.1% to 5.8% in this period. 
PROCAPTE’s MXN 6.5 billion in issues increased the banks’ average capitalization ratio to 
9.6% (Karaoglan and Lubrano 1995; World Bank 1995). Banks that did not seek 
PROCAPTE in the first round of recapitalizations were not excluded from applying in 
subsequent years (MXBU 1995). 
Analysts expected a greater number of banks to participate in PROCAPTE. According to the 
CNBV, the banks that did not sell convertible bonds met reserve and capital requirements 
(Bloomberg 1995b). It is unclear from the research whether receiving new capital from 
shareholders was a precondition to participating in the program. 
By the fall of 1995, only three banks remained in PROCAPTE, two of which were 
recapitalized through FOBAPROA's purchase of their loan portfolio and the other through 
an intervention (Karaoglan and Lubrano 1995). By June 1996, PROCAPTE holdings 
decreased to MXN 2.9 billion, with only two banks participating. By the end of 1996, this 
number rose to MXN 11.9 billion when one of the banks needed additional support. By June 
1997, both banks had liquidated their debts. Of the six banks that participated in 
PROCAPTE, only two remained under control of their original shareholders; three were 
eventually taken over by the authorities, and the other was taken over by another bank 
(Graf 1999; OECD 1998). Overall, PROCAPTE concluded within a year, as participating 
banks secured private capitalizations or were part of other interventions (World Bank 
1998). 
In June 1995, Serfin left PROCAPTE after the bank repurchased MXN 3.2 billion of its 
mandatorily convertible subordinated debentures and raised MXN 2.17 billion in new 
capital (Reuters 1995a). A top Serfin official estimated that the bank’s capitalization level 
 
4 Exchange rate on March 31, 1995, was MXN 6.82 = $1 (FRED 2020). 
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would surpass 9% once the operation was completed. He said that PROCAPTE gave the 
bank a capitalization ratio of more than 10% (Reuters 1995b). In June 1996, Confia also 
terminated its participation in PROCAPTE (Bloomberg 1997).  
All PROCAPTE recapitalizations were repaid, except for the capital injected to Inverlat of 
MXN 1.4 billion, plus accrued interest of MXN 700 million. This was converted into equity 
shares of the bank. However, the value of these shares was zero, the balance was written 
off, and FOBAPROA recognized the losses (Mackey 1999). 
Following the PROCAPTE recapitalization, the Mexican banking system began to attract 
foreign capital. Canada’s Scotiabank managed the operations of lnverlat with an option to 
acquire majority ownership in 2000. Citibank acquired Confia. All these transactions were 
facilitated by additional government support, most of it in the form of FOBAPROA’s 
purchases of troubled loans. Serfin, Mexico's third-largest bank, operated under an 
agreement in which HSBC acquired a 20% stake in the bank and played an active role in its 
management. Bital was largely controlled by a foreign financial institution. About 20% of 
the system’s assets were controlled by foreign financial institutions; including Serfin, the 
number would reach 30% (World Bank 1998). 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of package: Following the peso devaluation in December 1994, Mexico 
implemented multiple programs to contain the crisis. 
On January 3, 1995, the Mexican government announced a limited economic program. The 
program, known as the Agreement of Unity to Overcome the Economic Emergency 
(Acuerdo de Unidad para Superar la Emergencia Económica) committed the government to 
austerity, in hopes that the exercise would allow Mexico to access an IMF Stand-By 
Arrangement and reassure foreign investors (GAO 1996). Two months later, on March 3, 
1995, the government announced a revised and much broader financial package that 
contained specific measures to strengthen the financial system. It included fiscal and 
monetary adjustments, programs to deal with troubled banks, and an increase in the social 
safety net. Mexico received financial support through a $52 billion loan package from the 
international financial community, of which the US Treasury Department contributed $20 
billion, the International Monetary Fund $17.8 billion, and the Bank for International 
Settlements $10 billion, with the rest coming from other bilateral and multilateral sources 
(World Bank 1995). 
The first program introduced to recapitalize the banks was the Temporary Capitalization 
Program (PROCAPTE) in February 1995. PROCAPTE was intended to be a temporary 
program and was followed by further government measures such as the Capitalization and 
Loan Purchase of Bank Portfolio Program (CLPP) (World Bank 1995; see YPFS case by Leon 
Hoyos and Nye 2021 on FOBAPROA's broad-based asset purchases).    
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2. Legal authority: The Mexican Congress amended the Law of Credit Institutions in 
February 1995 to provide for public recapitalizations. 
In February 1995, the Mexican Congress amended the Law of Credit Institutions to remove 
legal restrictions for injecting capital into banks. The subordinated debentures were issued 
in accordance with Article 4 of the Law of Credit Institutions (Mackey 1999). 
The Temporary Capitalization Program (PROCAPTE) was announced through a Bank of 
Mexico circular of February 24, 1995, sent to commercial banking institutions and entered 
into effect on March 31, 1995 (World Bank 1995). 
3. Purpose: PROCAPTE was introduced to support the banking system and 
temporarily capitalize banks. 
Through PROCAPTE, the Mexican government aimed to provide a strong signal that it was 
prepared to support the banking system. PROCAPTE was designed to temporarily 
recapitalize banks that, due to the economic situation, were unable to recapitalize 
themselves. 
Banks had to deposit the cash from the temporary recapitalizations in the Bank of Mexico 
and could not use the cash proceeds from recapitalizations for new lending. However, the 
capital could be used to absorb losses if necessary. With this, the government aimed to 
demonstrate to the public, particularly foreigners, that it would not withdraw its support 
(Mackey 1999). 
4. Administration: The Bank Fund for Savings Protection (FOBAPROA) 
administered PROCAPTE. 
FOBAPROA acted as the administrator of PROCAPTE (World Bank 1995, 50–51, 97; Mackey 
1999). The Bank of Mexico managed PROCAPTE separately from other programs (World 
Bank 1995). 
FOBAPROA was established in 19905 as a trust (fideicomiso) managed by the Bank of 
Mexico. It served as a preventive support mechanism for commercial banks, as well as for 
savings protection. FOBAPROA was the government agency in charge of bank insolvencies 
(Graf 1999; World Bank 1995). It also played the roles of bank restructuring, deposit 
insurance, and in some cases, lender of last resort (World Bank 1995). FOBAPROA offered 
more than simple deposit insurance. It provided a blanket guarantee of all unsubordinated 
liabilities of the commercial banks (World Bank 1998). FOBAPROA had broad authority to 
provide credit to banks to help them fulfill their obligations to depositors and other liability 
holders (World Bank 1995). 
 
5 FOBAPROA is regulated by Article 122 of the Credit Institutions Law (Ley de Instituciones de Crédito), 
which became effective on July 18, 1990 and governs commercial and development banks (World Bank 
1995). 
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The Bank of Mexico managed the day-to-day operations of FOBAPROA. Meanwhile, 
FOBAPROA’s policy decisions were made by its nine-member Technical Committee: four 
from the Ministry of Finance, one being the Minister; three from the Bank of Mexico, one 
being the Governor; and two from the CNBV, one being the President (World Bank 1995). 
The chairman of the Technical Committee was from the Ministry of Finance and held the 
deciding vote (Mackey 1999). Although the CNBV contributed only two members to the 
Committee, it was mainly the CNBV, with the support of FOBAPROA staff, that prepared the 
technical documents that set the foundation for the decisions of the Technical Committee. 
The Bank of Mexico acted as the trustee of FOBAPROA, responsible for carrying out the 
Technical Committee’s resolutions and signed all agreements involving FOBAPROA’s 
financial assistance (Mackey 1999). 
FOBAPROA had the right to request a review performed by the CNBV or an external auditor 
of the accounting records of a participant bank while the bank participated in the program 
or for six months after its participation. Conversion rates could be adjusted based on the 
results these reviews (World Bank 1995). 
Eduardo Fernandez, former President of the CNBV, said that during the crisis, a tripartite 
committee not recognized in law operated permanently as an organ of decision and 
execution. It was integrated by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the Bank of 
Mexico (including FOBAPROA), and the National Banking and Securities Commission 
(CNBV) in which the CNBV served as the coordinator of this ad-hoc committee and matters 
were resolved in a very dynamic way. 
5. Size and timing: On March 31, 1995, six banks were recapitalized, including 
three of the five largest Mexican banks. 
On March 31, 1995, six banks were recapitalized, including Serfin, Inverlat, and Bital—the 
third-, fourth-, and fifth-largest banks in Mexico. The overall amount was $950 million. The 
size of the issue for each bank was sufficient to raise the capital level of each to 9% (World 
Bank 1995). The banks’ average capitalization ratio increased from 5.8% to 9.6% 
(Karaoglan and Lubrano 1995; World Bank 1995).  
6. Source of funding: PROCAPTE was funded by the Bank of Mexico through a loan 
by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
PROCAPTE was funded by the Bank of Mexico (World Bank 1995). The central bank offset 
the monetary impact of the program by requiring banks to deposit compensating reserves 
with the central bank (OECD, 1995). 
PROCAPTE was created principally through a loan of $3.25 billion provided by the Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank. Of that, $2.25 billion went directly to 
support the banking system, and $1 billion was directed toward helping banks support 
government social programs. The two international institutions, together with Mexican 
authorities, agreed to strengthen accounting and public reporting standards and conduct 
regular audits of their accounts to ensure the solvency of Mexican banking system (DJ 
1995). 
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Eduardo Fernandez, former President of the CNBV, said that funding for PROCAPTE was 
never required from the loan made available by the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. 
7. Eligible institutions: All Mexican commercial banks receiving shareholder 
approval could apply to PROCAPTE; banks with inadequate capital who chose 
not to participate faced mandatory recapitalization or charter suspension. 
Participation in PROCAPTE was voluntary and open to all Mexican commercial banks. 
However, banks whose capital fell below 8% of risk-weighted assets faced mandatory 
recapitalization by FOBAPROA or the loss of their banking charter if they did not 
participate. 
Banks seeking PROCAPTE assistance were required to submit a letter signed by the bank’s 
general manager during the last week of the month prior to receiving the recapitalization, 
with the obligation of later providing the financial details required by FOBAPROA and also 
the stockholder’s approval of corresponding agreements. The agreements for the issuance 
of the convertible debentures included recognizing any losses suffered before the 
conversion date. Shareholders of undercapitalized banks were required to submit a 
recapitalization plan within one month. If they did not, PROCAPTE would impose a 
recapitalization (World Bank 1995). 
8. Capital characteristics: Banks issued subordinated debentures to FOBAPROA, 
mandatorily convertible after five years into equity shares. 
Through PROCAPTE, banks issued subordinated debentures to FOBAPROA in accordance 
with Article 4 of the Law of Credit Institutions. These were convertible into equity shares 
(common stock) with voting rights after five years. FOBAPROA could convert the 
debentures earlier if the bank’s capital fell below 2% of risk-weighted assets or if its 
capitalization ratio deteriorated at a rate exceeding the rate of deterioration of the rest of 
the PROCAPTE banks by more than 25% (World Bank 1995). After five years, any unpaid 
amounts would be converted to ordinary capital and sold by the government. PROCAPTE 
aimed to support banks rather than shareholders and did not intend to handle insolvencies 
(OECD 1995). 
FOBAPROA bought the subordinated debentures with cash. However, banks had to deposit 
and maintain the cash proceeds in an account at the Bank of Mexico for the duration of the 
recapitalization (see Figure 2). The Bank of Mexico paid interest on the accounts at the 
same rate as the rate on the debentures. As a result, the debt was essentially costless to 
participating banks. The size of the issues were such that bank capital levels floated above 
9% (World Bank 1995).  
Banks participating in PROCAPTE had to maintain a capital ratio of at least 9% of net 
capital to risk-weighted assets (World Bank 1995). Banks were allowed to count the 
debentures to fulfill regulatory capital requirements (World Bank 1998). This requirement 
could be decreased to 8.5% if this decrease was the result of the establishment of 
preventive reserves. If a bank remained in trouble, the government could take over the 
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bank. If the capital ratio fell below 8.5%, FOBAPROA would acquire more subordinated 
debentures to reach the 9%. If a bank’s capitalization ratio increased above 9%, the bank 
could redeem, partially or fully, the subordinated debentures held by FOBAPROA before 
their conversion (Karaoglan and Lubrano 1995). The administrators of PROCAPTE 
reserved the right, in the event that market conditions improved, to demand that the bank 
recapitalize itself by purchasing all or part of the subordinate debentures upon one year’s 
notice (World Bank 1995). 
The issuer could acquire all or part of the debentures in the same proportion that it raised 
its capitalization level. The capitalization needed to support any growth had to come from 
the bank's own resources, such as profits and surplus, or from subordinated debentures 
not convertible into stock (World Bank 1995). 
Banks were not allowed issue dividends, additional capital debt, or additional mandatorily 
convertible subordinated debentures until they repaid FOBAPROA or unless these were 
issued aligned with PROCAPTE (Mackey 1999; World Bank 1995). 
Conversion terms  
FOBAPROA set the following formula for converting the subordinated debentures into 
equity. The institution would deliver the amount of shares resulting from the application of 







NA = Number of shares acquired as a result of the conversion. 
CC = The accounting capital on the last day of the month preceding the conversion date, or 
the arithmetic average of the accounting capital on the last day of the three months 
preceding that date, whichever was less. The CNBV and an external auditor had to approve 
the statistics.  
OS = Amount of the debentures issued for PROCAPTE added with their yields. 
A = Number of shares in circulation on the conversion date. If a bank had issued other 
mandatory convertible debentures, the amount obtained by applying the conversion 
formula agreed would be added to the number of shares. 
PROCAPTE was designed such that, under normal circumstances, FOBAPROA would not 
convert the debentures. But if FOBAPROA did exercise its right of conversion, it would 
dispose of the shares as soon as possible (World Bank 1995). 
9. Other conditions: Participating banks were subject to tighter supervision. 
PROCAPTE banks were subject to tighter supervision from the CNBV. Institutions 
suspended dividend payments and limited new loans (World Bank 1995). 
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10. Exit strategy: Banks could exit PROCAPTE by injecting new capital before the 
five-year term of the debentures expired. 
To exit PROCAPTE, banks had to inject new capital before the five-year term of the 
mandatorily convertible debentures expired. Some banks were able to do so with 
additional government support via the Capitalization and Loan Purchase of Bank Portfolio 
program (CLPP). Other banks failed to raise capital and were taken over by FOBAPROA, 
with the CNBV intervening in some cases (Mackey 1999). 
FOBAPROA could convert the debentures earlier if the bank’s capital fell below 2% of risk-
weighted assets or if its capitalization ratio deteriorated at a rate exceeding the rate of 
deterioration of the rest of the PROCAPTE banks by more than 25%. When FOBAPROA 
reached the status of majority shareholder of a bank, it would dilute or replace completely 
the previous shareholders and restructure the bank. To minimize this transitory situation, 
FOBAPROA would establish principles and programs for the resolution, restructuring, and 
sale of those banks. FOBAPROA followed several objectives in this process: to reduce 
systemic risk; to ensure safety and soundness of banks and saving institutions, and not 
shareholders; to promote public confidence; to minimize restructuring costs; to prevent 
interventions by acting in a timely fashion; and to minimize public-sector participation 
(World Bank 1995). 
PROCAPTE was designed such that, under normal circumstances, FOBAPROA would not 
convert the debentures. But if FOBAPROA did exercise its right of conversion, it would 
dispose of the shares as soon as possible (World Bank 1995). 
11. Fate of banks’ existing board and management: If participating banks’ capital 
ratio dropped below a certain threshold, FOBAPROA could replace management. 
If a bank’s capital adequacy ratio fell below zero, FOBAPROA would convert the 
subordinated debentures and replace the bank’s management. FOBAPROA would become 
the owner of the bank through the write-off of the previous capital and the subscription of 
a new capital issue. FOBAPROA then would put in place a program to recapitalize or 
rehabilitate, close, liquidate, sell, or merge the banks under its control (World Bank 1995). 
This was based upon the World Bank’s advice that retaining the same management and 
ownership during a recapitalization “is likely to be unfair and perverse, because it would 
provide incentives for bad management; and ineffective, since the same problems are likely 
to recur” (World Bank 1995). 
12. Changes in relevant regulation: To foster the entry of new capital, the Mexican 
Congress, at the urging of the authorities, modified bank ownership laws to 
permit foreign financial institutions to take control of troubled domestic banks. 
At the request of Mexican authorities, the Mexican Congress modified bank ownership laws 
to allow foreign financial institutions to control domestic banks that were in trouble. This 
accelerated the opening of Mexico's banking system to foreign participation (World Bank 
1998). 
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III. Evaluation 
Initially, financial markets were rattled, as the Mexican government seemed slow to 
respond, announcing only a limited economic program on January 3, 1995. Two months 
later, on March 3, 1995, the government announced a revised and much broader financial 
package that contained specific measures to strengthen the financial system. It included 
fiscal and monetary adjustments, programs to deal with troubled banks, and an increase in 
the social safety net (World Bank 1995). 
The introduction of PROCAPTE was met with mixed reactions. Although many bankers 
celebrated the effort to create a new source of capital for struggling banks, they expressed 
concern that the new system would increase government’s influence over commercial 
banks (LAD 1995a). One banking analyst commented that “the problem was that 
PROCAPTE involvement was not widely understood . . . . Banks which entered into the 
scheme acquired a sort of stigma, which damaged confidence” (Dombey 1995). The 
President of the CNBV added another perspective: “The only way current stockholders can 
maintain their control of the banks is if they inject fresh capital, otherwise their stake will 
be diluted in favor of FOBAPROA” (Dombey 1995). 
Moreover, the PROCAPTE Temporary Recapitalization Program was criticized because bad 
loans remained in the banks and the Bank of Mexico kept substantial sums of bank debt, 
convertible into equity after five years (Dombey 1995). In August 1995, Standard & Poor's 
assessed that PROCAPTE helped restore investor confidence during the difficult early 
months of 1995 and offered an opportunity to shareholders to restore their banks’ capital 
to adequate levels over the course of five years. The disadvantage was that “. . . it provided 
no cash to the banks, and a five-year period to restore capital to minimum levels could be 
viewed as generous” (WE 1995). 
Mackey (1999) comments that, while PROCAPTE sent a clear message that the government 
was ready to support the banking system as a whole, the market did not appear to view the 
participation of the individual banks in PROCAPTE as a positive measure. The market 
considered participation as a sign of weakness or as a prelude to intervention. This 
perception caused some banks to avoid participation in the program entirely and other 
banks to end their participation in the program in a shorter period than expected. 
Because of the negative public perception regarding participation in PROCAPTE, banks 
attempted to avoid participation by increasing their capital on their own. However, many 
banks were unable to raise capital during this period. As a result, additional measures were 
required following PROCAPTE. 
PROCAPTE was not designed to provide new, permanent capital on its own. Mackey (1999) 
concludes by noting that 
While the temporary capital could not be utilized by the banks because the proceeds of the 
subordinated debentures were required to be deposited in the central bank, such capital 
was available to be used to absorb losses (if required) and this was considered important 
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in demonstrating, especially to foreigners, that the government would not withdraw its 
support from the banks.  
Mackey also states that the banks “essentially complied with the program and the 
supervision of the program was adequate. Overall, PROCAPTE appears to have been 
relatively effective if compared to its narrowly defined objectives of sending a clear 
message to the market that the government would support the banks” (Mackey 1999). 
Eduardo Fernandez, former President of the CNBV said that PROCAPTE bought precious 
time for the Mexican government to attract new capital, without injecting a single peso to 
the banking system. Banks were “legally recapitalized,” the domestic run was avoided, and 
the external funding of the largest Mexican banks was maintained. The rating agencies did 
not downgrade the Mexican banking system excessively. While in the meantime, by 
different means, banks were able to strengthen their capital base.  
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